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The 1990s have witnessed several balance-of-payments crises. In contrast
to the crises of previous decades, in which government deﬁcits took center
stage, these new crises have been twin currency and banking crises, in which
bank lending has taken center stage.
The blame for these new crises has been laid at the feet of the policies that
have been implemented in emerging markets during the last decade. Fre-
quently, ﬁnancial liberalization and banks’ privatization have led to lending
booms and asset price inﬂation episodes that have resulted in crises. It has
been argued in some policy quarters that this has occurred because ﬁnan-
cial liberalization has been inevitably associated with bailout guarantees,
which have encouraged overinvestment and excessive risk taking.1Further-
more, it has been suggested that ﬁxed exchange rates have exacerbated the
problem by inducing agents to borrow in foreign currency on an unhedged
basis. This paper will question these views.
Even if we accept that bailout guarantees are the inevitable consequence
of ﬁnancial liberalization and banks’ privatization, it does not follow that
the liberalization policies of the early 1990s were doomed to fail.2 I will ar-
gue that neither ﬁnancial liberalization, the exchange rate regime, nor
bailout guarantees were the main villains; rather, the culprit was the lack of
an appropriate regulatory framework in the ﬁnancial sector.
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1. Bailout guarantees are deemed necessary either because many ﬁrms face a severely credit-
constrained environment or because of political pressures.
2. I would like to emphasize that I am not defending policy measures enacted simply to mask
corruption.In the course of my argument I will make a distinction between “sys-
temic” and “unconditional” bailout guarantees. The former are granted
only if a critical mass of agents defaults. The latter are granted on an idio-
syncratic basis whenever there is an individual default. I will argue that if
authorities can commit to granting only systemic guarantees, and if the
other parts of the regulatory framework work eﬃciently, then ﬁnancial lib-
eralization policies will induce higher long-run growth in a credit-
constrained economy. In this environment, crises are thus not the inevitable
consequence of bad policy, but simply bad draws that need not happen. The
risk of bad draws is the price that must be paid in order to attain faster
growth in a credit-constrained environment. In contrast, if guarantees are
granted on an unconditional basis or if the regulatory framework is ineﬃ-
cient, the monitoring and disciplinary role of banks will be nonexistent.
Therefore, ﬁnancial liberalization will simply lead to overinvestment and
corruption. Liberalization in such an economy will surely end in crisis.
This paper makes ﬁve main points. First, systemic bailout guarantees are
a second-best instrument to promote investment in emerging economies.
Severe enforceability problems make bank credit practically the only source
of external ﬁnance for ﬁrms in the nontradables sector. In this environment,
many proﬁtable investment projects cannot be undertaken because agents
are credit-constrained. Guarantees promote investment because they ease
borrowing constraints and provide an implicit subsidy. In contrast to de-
posit insurance schemes, systemic bailout guarantees are only granted if a
critical mass of agents goes bust. Thus, they do not eliminate the monitor-
ing role of banks.
Second, risky debt plays a useful role in promoting investment. The sub-
sidy implicit in systemic bailout guarantees can be cashed in only if there
exist some states of the world in which there is a systemic crisis. In the ab-
sence of exogenous shocks that bankrupt many agents, there must be en-
dogenous expected volatility. Lending booms and risky dollar debt can gen-
erate this endogenous volatility by making the economy vulnerable to
self-fulﬁlling crises. Clearly, an economy might evolve along the transition
path without experiencing any crisis. In fact, the likelihood of crisis must be
small. Otherwise, systemic bailout guarantees might have the unintended
eﬀect of drastically reducing productive investment.
Third, a consequence of the previous point is that if prudential regulation
tries to eliminate all risk in the banking system, it might block the invest-
ment-enhancing eﬀect of systemic bailout guarantees. In contrast, a very
important role of prudential regulation is prevention of fraudulent activi-
ties. If not accompanied by a concurrent improvement in prudential regu-
lation, bank privatization and other reforms that improve the contracting
environment among private agents might not improve social welfare. This
raises the issue of why many emerging countries have failed to improve their
regulatory frameworks; I suggest that in some cases it has been due to po-
litical causes.
706 Aaron TornellFourth, the forces that generate boom-bust cycles are independent of the
exchange rate regime. In particular, systemic bailout guarantees can induce
the adoption of risky debt structures in ﬁxed as well as in ﬂexible exchange
rate regimes. Guarantees may appear under diﬀerent guises and need not
be explicit. The precise form the bailout takes will depend on the regime.
For instance, under ﬁxed rates the bailout rate is mostly determined by the
amount of reserves authorities are willing to use in order to defend the cur-
rency. In contrast, in a pure ﬂoating regime the bailout may take the form
of direct transfers to agents.
Fifth, in the event of a crisis the amount of nonperforming loans in-
creases dramatically. If they are recognized, the most likely outcome is that
the government will have to take over the banking system, make a once-
and-for-all bailout payment, and incur a huge ﬁscal cost up front. This will
increase government debt and, probably, interest rates. On the other hand,
if only a small share of nonperforming loans is recognized, the up-front
bailout and ﬁscal cost will be low. However, this strategy might lead to ever-
greening and generate perverse incentives. Over time the problem might
grow and the credit crunch might last longer, as the experiences of Japan
and Mexico have shown.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section presents some
stylized facts. Section 15.3 presents the conceptual framework. Section
15.4, which is the main part of the paper, analyzes the issues raised above.
Finally, section 15.5 concludes.
15.2 Stylized Facts
Typically, during the 1990s crises were preceded by real exchange rate ap-
preciation and by lending booms, during which bank lending grew unusu-
ally rapidly.3 During these lending booms, emerging economies became
fragile because a signiﬁcant amount of banks’ short-term liabilities were de-
nominated in foreign currency on an unhedged basis. Meanwhile, banks
lent mainly to ﬁrms in the nontradables sector. Much of this lending was
guaranteed by governments—at least implicitly.
Twin banking and currency crises often occurred in the absence of any
major external shock and came as a surprise to ﬁnancial markets. In these
episodes, a small incipient reduction in capital inﬂows was followed by a
signiﬁcant real exchange rate depreciation. Because debt was largely de-
nominated in foreign currency, the depreciation has induced widespread
bankruptcies and a collapse of new lending. In most countries, rescue pack-
ages were designed to support the banking system and to bail out foreign
lenders. Nevertheless, these countries still experienced sharp and long-
lasting credit crunches.
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3. Real appreciation has been particularly severe in Latin America. See Corsetti, Pesenti, and
Roubini (1999). Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1995); Gourinchas, Landerretche, and Valdés
(2001). Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999); Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1996); and Tornell (1999).A puzzling pattern is that the contraction in the growth rate of bank
credit that typically develops in the aftermath of crises is quite pronounced
and persistent. In contrast, although growth in aggregate GDP and in de-
posits declines initially, it recuperates rather quickly. This puzzle can be ex-
plained by two additional stylized facts, which we will emphasize through-
out this paper. First, the milder decline and faster recovery of aggregate
activity in the aftermath of a crisis masks an asymmetric performance be-
tween diﬀerent sectors of the economy. Whereas tradables (T) sectors suﬀer
a very mild decline, nontradables (N) sectors suﬀer a very deep and persist-
ent recession.
Second, the banking system is typically strongly exposed to the N sector.
Because the real depreciation had a “balance sheet” eﬀect mainly in the N
sector, entrepreneurial wealth in the N sector is drastically reduced. This, in
turn, keeps the growth rate of bank credit depressed, despite the fast re-
sumption of growth in aggregate gross domestic product (GDP) and de-
posits—that is, a credit crunch.
These stylized facts are illustrated in ﬁgures 15.1 through 15.3. These ﬁg-
ures depict the evolution of the real exchange rate, bank credit and deposits,
GDP, and the ratio of nontradables to tradables production for six emerg-
ing economies: Argentina and Mexico, which suﬀered a crisis in 1995; Ko-
rea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand, which experienced a crisis in
1997; and Chile, which experienced a severe crisis in the early 1980s but not
during the 1990s, and so can be considered as a benchmark.
15.3 Conceptual Framework
In order to address the policy issues we have raised, it is necessary to un-
derstand the context in which policy rules were designed and the underlying
imperfections they were supposed to counteract. In order to do this, one
needs a conceptual framework that can explain the basic features of the
boom-bust cycles experienced by emerging economies during the 1990s.
This paper will use the model developed by Schneider and Tornell (2000) to
make such an evaluation.
To  explain some of the stylized facts that we have described, “third-
generation” crises models have looked to ﬁnancial market imperfections as
key fundamentals. The models are typically based on one of two distortions:
either bad policy, in the form of bailout guarantees, or bad markets, in the
form of an imperfection that induces balance sheet eﬀects, such as asym-
metric information, or the imperfect enforceability of contracts.4 Schneider
and Tornell (2000) consider an economy that is simultaneously subject to
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4. See Aghion, Bachetta, and Banerjee (2000); Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999);
Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2000); Caballero and Krishnamurthy (1999); Calvo








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































dthese two distortions: systemic bailout guarantees and the imperfect en-
forceability of contracts. They show that the interactionof the two distortions
generates a coherent account of a complete boom-bust episode and explains
the stylized facts described in the previous section. Thus, this framework will
prove useful in addressing the policy issues the paper has raised.
This section presents some elements of the Schneider-Tornell model that
will be useful in addressing the policy issues raised in the introduction. The
model considers an economy with enforceability problems in ﬁnancial mar-
kets that exhibits underinvestment, especially in the N sector. The intro-
duction of systemic bailout guarantees can increase investment and growth
by relaxing borrowing constraints. However, this comes at the cost of mak-
ing the economy vulnerable to self-fulﬁlling meltdowns. Systemic bailout
guarantees induce agents to switch from safe debt to risky foreign currency–
denominated debt, generating aggregate real exchange rate risk.
Consider an economy with a T sector and an N sector. Agents in the T
sector can be ﬁnanced in international capital markets. In contrast, bank
credit is the only source of external ﬁnance for agents in the N sector.
Agents in the N sector demand T goods for consumption and produce non-
tradables using only nontradables as inputs according to a linear produc-
tion technology: qt    It. Agents in the T sector are endowed with T goods
and consume both T and N goods.
In order to model the debt-denomination decision, allow N-sector agents
to issue either “risky debt” or “safe debt.” Risky debt is denominated in T
goods (foreign currency) on an unhedged basis, whereas safe debt is de-
nominated in N goods. Thus, it has no real exchange rate risk.
N-sector ﬁnancing is subject to two distortions: enforceability problems
and bailout guarantees. Consider ﬁrst an economy in which only enforce-
ability problems are present, as in standard ﬁnancial accelerator models.
High enforceability problems imply that lenders will limit the amount they
lend regardless of what the interest rate is. As a result, the amount of credit
available to a ﬁrm will be determined by the level of its internal funds. If in-
vestment has a suﬃciently high rate of return, an N-sector ﬁrm will borrow
as much as it can. As a result, the credit multiplier becomes an investment
multiplier. One can show that
(1) ptIt
s   ms(h)   w t,
where w t is internal funds (denominated in T goods) of a representative N-
sector ﬁrm; pt pt
N/pt
Tis the inverse of the real exchange rate; ms(h) is the in-
vestment multiplier, which is decreasing in the degree of the enforceability
problem (indexed by 1/h); and It is physical investment by the N sector. Al-
though safe debt is more expensive than risky debt, in the presence of bank-
ruptcy costs, issuing safe debt is individually optimal. Thus, in the absence
of exogenous shocks, the economy will not exhibit fragility to meltdowns.
Under no circumstances will ﬁrms go bust.
712 Aaron TornellLet us introduce the second distortion: bailout guarantees. As mentioned
in the introduction, one should distinguish two types of bailout guarantees:
unconditional and systemic. The former are granted whenever there is a de-
fault by an individual borrower (e.g., deposit insurance), whereas the latter
are granted only if a critical mass of borrowers goes bust. Clearly, if all debt
were covered by unconditional bailout guarantees, then the enforceability
problem would become irrelevant and borrowing constraints would not
arise in equilibrium. Because a lender would be bailed out in the case of an
idiosyncratic default, he does not have incentives to limit the amount of
credit he extends to an individual borrower. Hence, in order for bailout
guarantees not to neutralize the eﬀects of enforceability problems, and for
borrowing constraints to arise in equilibrium, it is necessary that some part
of banks’ liabilities be covered only by systemic bailout guarantees.
As we shall see, systemic bailout guarantees provide an implicit subsidy
that eases borrowing constraints. However, this subsidy can be cashed in
only if there are some states of nature in which a critical mass of borrowers
goes bust. In the absence of exogenous shocks that bankrupt a critical mass
of borrowers, the introduction of systemic bailout guarantees will have an
eﬀect only if there is aggregate endogenous risk.
15.3.1 Bailout Guarantees and Risky Debt Denomination
The ﬁrst main result is that the interactionof systemic bailout guarantees
and enforceability problems might generate aggregate endogenous risk.
This is because there is a self-reinforcing mechanism at work. On the one
hand, if there is suﬃcient real exchange rate risk, it is individually optimal
for an N-sector agent to issue risky T debt (i.e., borrow in foreign currency
on a short-term and unhedged basis). On the other hand, if many N-sector
agents gamble by denominating their debt in T goods, exchange rate risk
might be endogenously created, as the economy becomes vulnerable to self-
fulﬁlling meltdownsof the banking system. If the amount of T-denominated
debt is high, a real depreciation can severely squeeze cash ﬂow or even
bankrupt banks altogether. Because they face binding borrowing con-
straints, they then must curtail lending to the N sector. Weak investment de-
mand from the N sector for its own products in turn validates the real de-
preciation. The systemic credit risk created by the banking system thus
induces endogenous exchange rate risk.5
Real exchange rate variability can make risky T debt cheaper than safe N
debt. As an illustration, suppose that tomorrow’s real exchange rate can
take on two values: an appreciated one that leaves every ﬁrm solvent (p  t 1),
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5. There are several ways in which agents can adopt risky projects. However, risky debt de-
nomination (borrowing in dollars to ﬁnance nontradables activities) is a wonderful “coordi-
nating device.” Because debt denomination is easily observed, agents can implicitly collude to
cash in the subsidy implicit in the bailout guarantee.and a depreciated one that makes a majority of N-sector ﬁrms go bust
(p
 
t 1). Because lenders constrain credit to ensure that borrowers will repay
in the no-crisis state, it follows that in the no-crisis state debt is repaid in full
and there is no bailout. Meanwhile, in the crisis state there is bankruptcy,
and each lender receives a proportion Fof what he or she was promised. Be-
cause the probability of crisis is 1 –  , interest rates on T goods–and N-
good–denominated debt ( t and  t
n, respectively) satisfy
(2) (1    t) [  (1    )F]   1   r,
(1    t
n) [ p  t 1   (1    )p
 
t 1F]   1   r,
where r is the world interest rate. If we set F   1, interest rates are given by
(3) 1    t   1   r,
1    t
n   










Because p  t 1 p
 
t 1, we can see that T debt is cheaper than N debt for all pos-
itive bailout rates (F   0): the interest rate as well as the expected repay-
ments per unit debt is lower for T debt. We can see directly from equation
(2) that  t    t
n. Because debt is repaid with probability  , expected repay-
ment per unit debt is  (1   r)/[  (1 –  )F] for T debt and  (1   r)/[  
(1 –  )F
p
    p] for N debt.
The fact that T debt is cheaper than N debt does not imply that agents
will always be willing to issue T debt: T debt in the books might lead a bor-
rower to go bust. One can show that when there are no guarantees (F   0)
it is optimal for an agent to choose a safe plan that never leads to bank-
ruptcy. However, if crises are rare events (  is large), bailouts are generous
(F is large), and there is enough real exchange rate variability
(4)  










 1  ,
then it is individually optimal to choose a risky plan that leads to bank-
ruptcy in the crisis state. Because the bailout agency will pay part of the
promise in the bad state, it is desirable for an agent to shift as much of the
payment as possible into the bad state. This is achieved precisely by de-
nominating all debt in tradables. Because lenders must break even, switch-
ing from N to T debt always shifts some of the debt burden from the good
to the bad state, making the borrower better oﬀ.
An important implication of the preceding results is that systemic bailout
guarantees may alleviate the “underinvestment” problem usually associ-
ated with borrowing-constrained economies. They permit high leverage
with debt denominated in T goods and faster credit growth. As we have
seen, the presence of guarantees induces N-sector agents to issue T debt.
Because the real exchange rate is expected to appreciate in the no-crisis state
714 Aaron Tornell(i.e., eq. [4] holds), this allows agents to reduce the expected value of debt
repayments, measured in terms of nontradables.6 This reduction, in turn,
permits agents to borrow more at each level of internal funds. Therefore, at
a given point in time, the investment multiplier is greater than that of an
economy that features only enforceability problems (ms). In fact, one can
show that in the presence of bailout guarantees (F   0) the value of invest-
ment by the N sector is
(5) ptIt   mr(h, F)   w t, ms(h)   mr(h, F) if F   0.
Thus, the N sector grows faster than it would if guarantees were absent.
15.3.2 Endogenous Real Exchange Rate Risk
When is it that the existence of T debt generates real exchange rate risk?
To answer this question, consider the determination of the equilibrium real
exchange rate (1/pt). This price equalizes aggregate demand and the (prede-
termined) supply of nontradables ( It–1). The aggregate demand for N
goods has two components: the demand by the T sector, d T(pt), and the in-
vestment demand by the N sector for its own goods (It). Thus, pt is deter-
mined by
(6)  It 1   d T(pt)   It(pt, bt 1, bN
t 1),
where bt–1 and bN
t–1 are the amounts of T debt and N debt carried over from
the last period. Because at a given point in time supply is given, the key to
having multiple equilibria is a backward-bending aggregate demand curve.
This is impossible if N-sector ﬁrms have only N debt. In this case, price
changes lead to variations in both ﬁrms’ revenues and their debt payments.
In fact, proﬁts (measured in nontradables) are completely insulated against
price movements. The upshot is that as long as ﬁrms are solvent, demand
slopes downward and there is a unique equilibrium real exchange rate.
Multiple equilibria are possible only if N-sector agents have T debt. In
this case, real exchange rate movements aﬀect revenues but not the debt
burden. Thus, it becomes important to distinguish between insolvent and
solvent ﬁrms. For real exchange rates more depreciated than a cutoﬀ level
1/pt
c, all N ﬁrms go bankrupt because revenues do not cover the debt bur-
den. As a result, internal funds collapse. Total demand in this range is
downward sloping. In contrast, for real exchange rates more appreciated
than 1/pt
c, a further real appreciation is accompanied by a more than pro-
portionalincrease in internal funds. The reason is that revenues increase the
debt burden remains the same. Equivalently, part of the debt burden mea-
sured in terms of nontradables is inﬂated away. Consequently, investment
demand increases.
It is apparent that if the balance sheet eﬀect is strong enough to make
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6. Below I discuss the conditions under which equation (4) holds along the equilibrium path.aggregate demand “bend backward,” as in ﬁgure 15.4, multiple market-
clearing real exchange rates, and hence self-fulﬁlling twin crises, can exist.
With identical fundamentals, in terms of supply and debt, the market may
clear in one of two equilibria. In a solvent equilibrium (point B in ﬁg. 15.4),
the price (the reciprocal of the real exchange) is high, inﬂating away enough
of ﬁrms’ debt (measured in nontradables) to allow them to bid away a large
share of output from the T sector. In contrast, in the crisis equilibrium of
point A, the price is low to allow the T-sector and bankrupt N-sector agents
with little internal funds to absorb the supply of nontradables. Expectations
determine which of these two points is reached. Fundamentals determine
only whether the environment is fragile enough to allow two equilibria.
15.3.3 Equilibrium Dynamics
We have seen that, in the absence of bailout guarantees, managers will
not be inclined to issue T debt. In the model, the only source of uncertainty
is the sunspot. Furthermore, multiple market-clearing prices, which are
crucial for a sunspot to matter, exist only if debt is denominated in trad-
ables. It follows that, in the absence of bailout guarantees, there cannot
be an equilibrium in which prices depend on the sunspot. Instead, in
economies without bailout guarantees, equilibria must be “safe,” and ﬁrms
are always solvent.
Consider now an economy in which systemic bailout guarantees are pres-
ent. Will the economy exhibit risky lending booms, which allow for faster
growth (ﬁnanced by cheap T debt) but may end in self-fulﬁlling twin crises?
To address this question we need to establish the existence of sunspot equi-
libria along which crises can actually occur with positive probability (i.e., 1
–   0).7That is, we need to construct an equilibrium price process by mak-
ing the sunspot select among market-clearing prices, such that the resulting
return distribution encourages ﬁrms to issue enough T debt to validate the
price process.
Recall that there are two mechanisms at work. On the one hand, if there
is enough T debt, there are two possible market-clearing prices, of which the
lower price bankrupts ﬁrms and hence triggers a bailout. On the other
hand, agents will choose T debt if there is enough real exchange rate vari-
ability. The question is whether these two mechanisms can be elements of
one consistent dynamic story.
Suppose that the future demand for N goods is high enough that agents
will be able to repay their debts. Then one can prove that if bailouts are gen-
erous enough, initial funds of the representative agent are large enough, and
the horizon is long enough, then there exists a certain time interval in which
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7. It is technically simpler to focus on unanticipated crises, but this is conceptually unsatis-
factory for several reasons. First, only if crises are anticipated can one rationalize this fragility
as a result of risky debt denomination. Second, only if crises are anticipated can one make the
point that growth is faster with bailout guarantees.the sunspot can matter and self-fulﬁlling crises can be anticipated. During
this time interval a crisis must be a rare event in order for an equilibrium to
exist.
Along the equilibrium path, as long as no crisis has occurred, there is a
self-reinforcing feedback between lending and real exchange rate apprecia-
tion, which explains the other stylized facts described in the previous sec-
tion. Because N goods are demanded for investment by the N sector itself,
both output and the relative price of nontradables increase during the
boom. Furthermore, because debt is denominated in T goods, a real appre-
ciation (a relative price increase) reduces the debt burden measured in terms
of nontradables. This increases N-sector agents’ cash ﬂow. For constrained
agents, this translates into more lending through a balance sheet eﬀect.
More lending, in turn, permits more investment in N goods. In order to
close the circle, note that if the investment increase is greater than the higher
output, the real exchange rate must appreciate in order to eliminate the ex-
cess demand for nontradables.
A crisis occurs when the bad state of the sunspot is realized. The result is
a real depreciation and widespread bankruptcies in the N sector. This de-
pletes the internal funds of the N sector. Thus, its investment drops and can
only gradually recover (due to the ﬁnancial adjustment costs mentioned
above). At the same time, demand by the T sector jumps up. Again, this
highlights the asymmetric patterns followed by the N sector and the T sec-
tor.
To highlight the fact that, although systemic bailout guarantees might in-
duce faster economic growth by easing borrowing constraints, they increase
the likelihood of a crisis, consider two economies, A and B. The only diﬀer-
ence between these economies is that A has systemic bailout guarantees.
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Fig. 15.4 Equilibrium in the nontradables’ marketThen there is a sunspot equilibrium in which A and B behave identically up
to a certain time, after which the N sector in economy A grows faster and
exhibits higher leverage along the lucky path, as long as a crisis does not oc-
cur. However, A experiences a crisis and subsequent recession with positive
probability, whereas B does not.
15.3.4 Necessary Ingredients for Boom-Bust Cycles
A key point of Schneider and Tornell (2000) is that the interactionof con-
tract enforceability problems and bailout guarantees creates the fragility re-
quired for self-fulﬁlling crises. If there were no guarantees, ﬁrms would not
be willing to take on price risk to claim a subsidy. Costly enforceability of
contracts would still imply that the N sector could grow only gradually, and
balance sheet eﬀects would play a role during the lending boom. However,
there would be no force that makes a boom end in a crisis. Alternatively,
if there were only guarantees but no enforceability problems, then there
would not be any balance sheet eﬀects that make demand backward-
bending, a necessary condition for a sunspot to matter.
Lending booms that feature fragility cannot occur in just any economy
with bailout guarantees and enforceability problems. It is also necessary to
have a future increase in the demand of the T sector for nontradables. Oth-
erwise, the N sector would not be able to repay the accumulated deﬁcits it
runs during the lending boom. Backward induction then indicates that the
sequence of returns that supports the lending boom would collapse. This
suggests that the boom-bust episodes are more likely to occur during a tran-
sition period (for instance, following a far-reaching reform or a natural re-
source discovery).
Even during a transitional period, the likelihood of a self-fulling crisis is
not a free parameter. If crises were not rare events, either borrowing con-
straints would not arise, or they would not be binding in equilibrium if they
did arise. In either case, credit would not be constrained by internal funds,
and balance sheet eﬀects would not exist in equilibrium. Clearly, if this were
the case, crises could not occur. If the probability of crises is not small
enough, enforceability problems do not generate borrowing constraints.
15.4 Policy Evaluation
An emerging economy is an economy in which the future is much
brighter than the present but proﬁtable investment projects cannot be un-
dertaken because the private sector is small (i.e., entrepreneurial wealth is
low) and the amount of external ﬁnancing is severely limited. The reforms
of the late 1980s liberalized trade and ﬁnancial markets in many emerging
markets. These reforms also signiﬁcantly reduced the role of the state in the
economy. Suddenly, the future looked much brighter than before, and the
718 Aaron Tornellprivate sector much smaller than was desirable. Unfortunately, legal and ju-
dicial reform could not be implemented as easily as the other reforms. As a
result, many of the institutions that support the provision of external ﬁ-
nance in developed economies did not ﬂourish in emerging markets.
The policy problem then became one of better promoting the fast devel-
opment of the private sector in an environment in which external ﬁnance to
the domestic sector is constrained by internal funds of ﬁrms, and credit and
investment are too low relative to investment opportunities. One is tempted
to say that if a government had had the appropriate information and cor-
rect incentives, the optimal policy would have been to transfer resources to
those in the population with better entrepreneurial skills and to let them
make the investing decisions. Of course, we now know that this is wishful
thinking. After many failed experiments of this sort during the last century,
we now know that either governments do not posses the appropriate infor-
mation, or crony capitalism and rampant corruption take over.
Since direct made-to-measure government transfers are not feasible, dur-
ing the 1990s governments had to design second-best policies to foster the
development of the private sector. Many countries made the decision to pri-
vatize the banks and allow them to be the means through which resources
would be channeled to the nascent private sector. The issues described in the
introduction should be analyzed from this perspective.
If ﬁnancial liberalization and bank privatization are implemented in a
context of unconditional bailout guarantees and a lax regulatory frame-
work, then they will clearly lead to corruption and crisis. However, if ap-
propriate regulation is put in place and authorities are committed to grant
bailouts only in a systemic fashion, then one might argue that, when taking
into consideration the distortions that exist in emerging markets there is
as e nse in which these policies are second-best instruments for fostering
the private sector’s growth. We would like to emphasize that we are not
defending some policy measures that simply mask corruption. Those are
clearly indefensible.
Consider the two-sector economy described in section 15.3. Firms in the
T sector can easily obtain ﬁnancing in international capital markets, either
because they can pledge their export receivables as collateral or because
they are closely linked to ﬁrms that can secure their debt. In contrast, ﬁrms
in the N sector must rely more heavily on domestic bank credit. Further-
more, because emerging markets face acute enforceability problems, ﬁrms
in the N sector face severe borrowing constraints that limit their ability to
undertake proﬁtable projects. As a result, the growth rate of the economy is
kept below its potential. It follows that a policy maker whose objective is to
maximize social welfare must design second-best policies that will ease bor-
rowing constraints and increase investment in the N sector. Because the N
sector and the T sector compete for productive resources, and because any
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port level for the N sector cannot be arbitrarily large.8
15.4.1 Policies During a Boom
Systemic versus Unconditional Bailout Guarantees
We have seen that in the presence of severe enforceability problems in ﬁ-
nancial markets, credit is constrained by internal funds. As a result, prof-
itable investment projects will not be undertaken, especially in the N sector.
Thus, over the medium run, growth will be signiﬁcantly lower than its po-
tential. This indicates that systemic bailout guarantees might actually play
a socially beneﬁcial role. Systemic bailout guarantees provide an implicit
subsidy that reduces the cost at which ﬁrms can fund themselves and in-
creases the credit multiplier. This increases investment and growth at each
level of internal funds. In the absence of better instruments to promote in-
vestment and growth of the N sector, systemic bailout guarantees are a sec-
ond-best instrument for making transfers to this sector. We would like to
emphasize that this mechanism uses the information and monitoring ca-
pacity of banks.
Consider the generosity of bailout guarantees (F) as the policy instru-
ment.9 An increase in F induces an increase in the investment multiplier in
equation (5), which in turn leads to a higher growth rate of the N sector.
Therefore, in an emerging economy it is optimal to set Fhigher than zero in
order to reduce the underinvestment problem. However, there are tradeoﬀs.
First, the greater F is, the greater the contingent ﬁscal cost; second, the
greater F is, the greater the share of resources allocated to the N sector at
the expense of the T sector. Therefore, the level of F should not be set too
high. There is an interior optimum.
Three points should be emphasized. First, if banks in a given country
play no monitoring role and are prone to fraud, systemic bailout guarantees
will not be socially beneﬁcial. Second, systemic bailout guarantees do not
curtail the discipline faced by either individual banks or ﬁrms, because they
are granted only if a critical mass of agents defaults. At the same time, sys-
temic bailout guarantees generate an investment subsidy only if the banks’
portfolios are risky, that is, only if there exist states of nature in which there
is systemic crisis. In the absence of large exogenous shocks, this means that
some risk must be endogenously generated by the banking system in order
for guarantees to be eﬀective in promoting investment (the paper addresses
this issue below). Third, systemic bailout guarantees imply that the govern-
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8. The ﬁscal costs associated with bailout guarantees are typically paid by domestic taxpay-
ers, not by international organizations. Jeanne and Zettelmeyer (2000) show that in most cases
the IMF has been repaid the loans it made to crisis countries in order to bail out lenders.
9. As shall be discussed below, there are several ways in which systemic bailout guarantees
can be implemented.ment can credibly commit not to bail out individual agents in the case of
idiosyncratic default.
The experience of Mexico during the 1990s illustrates, in a rather sharp
manner, the policy dilemma faced by reformers. Several critics have pointed
to the “false rosy expectations” generated by the government in the early
1990s and the promises of bailout guarantees as the culprits in the Tequila
crisis. Certainly, in hindsight this is true, a policy maker would say. How-
ever, at that time the policy seemed a sensible one. It was a way to avoid low
growth and bottlenecks in the N sector that would otherwise have limited
the overall future growth of the economy. Moreover, from a political stand-
point the development of the private sector encouraged by the policy had
the added virtue of creating new power bases that would block attempts by
statist groups to return to the old ways. It was a way to ensure the continu-
ity of the reforms.
An important issue has not yet been discussed is unconditional bailout
guarantees, which are granted whenever an individual debtor defaults. De-
posit insurance is a prime example. If all guarantees were unconditional,
the discipline in the banking system would disappear and guarantees would
not play the investment-promoting role described above. However, if un-
conditional bailout guarantees are granted to small bank depositors, they
may play a socially beneﬁcial role. This policy avoids bank-runs generated
by burgeoning rumors but does not impinge negatively on the market disci-
pline faced by an individual bank because small depositors typically have
very little information regarding the bank’s portfolio. As is the case in the
United States, market discipline should be imposed by noninsured bank
debt, the interest rate of which should serve as an indicator of a bank’s
health.
The Role of Risky Dollar Debt
As mentioned above, systemic bailout guarantees have only investment-
enhancing eﬀects in the presence of risk. In the absence of large exogenous
shocks, some endogenous volatility must be present if the policy is to be
eﬀective. Therefore, outlawing risky dollar debt could undo the investment-
enhancing eﬀects of systemic bailout guarantees. Thus, if the conditions of
a country call for bailouts as a second-best policy to promote the growth of
the private sector, then risky debt (or another way to generate endogenous
volatility) must also be allowed. Of course, this does not mean that banks
should be allowed to have outrageously risky portfolios. It merely means
that a naive policy of outlawing risky dollar debt is not correct from a nor-
mative perspective.
Because systemic bailout guarantees can only be cashed in states of the
world in which a critical mass of borrowers goes bust, they are eﬀective in
increasing investment only if an important sector of the economy is vulner-
able to a meltdown. It is only during such a meltdown that the bailout
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is determined by the likelihood of the crisis and the generosity of the
bailout. The greater the expected value of the subsidy, the lower the interest
rates that lenders are willing to accept. Clearly, bank portfolios cannot be
outrageously risky, because the likelihood of crisis must be quite small in or-
der for the mechanism identiﬁed in this paper to be operative. Otherwise,
ﬁrms would not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to borrow and invest in the ﬁrst place!
Note, however, that small is not the same as zero. In the absence of major
exogenous shocks, fragility must come from within the system. This is pre-
cisely the role of risky debt denomination. As explained above, if a major-
ity of borrowers has unhedged debt, the economy as a whole can become
vulnerable to self-fulﬁlling crises. Furthermore, dollar debt is a wonderful
coordinating device, because it can be observed by others. It plays the same
role as the real-estate buildup on an uninsured basis in catastrophe-prone
areas. The principle that “if everyone else does it, then I am safe” reigns.
From a positive perspective, it is also impossible to outlaw dollar short-
term debt. Many ﬁrms need such debt in order to carry out their interna-
tional transactions. Because it is impossible to distinguish what part of dol-
lar debt is used by a given ﬁrm to ﬁnance international transactions, it is not
feasible to enforce a law that forbids dollar debt for uses other than inter-
national trade. This lesson has been painfully learned by many countries
that have tried to implement dual exchange rates and then were faced with
rampant misinvoicing of imports and exports.
In conclusion, the degree of banks’ and ﬁrms’ portfolio riskiness should
be strictly regulated. However, risky debt should not be outlawed altogether.
It is neither socially optimal nor practically implementable.
The Role of Lending Booms and Asset Price Inﬂation
During a lending boom credit grows unusually fast, and, as many ob-
servers have pointed out, monitoring eﬀectiveness declines. Thus, it is less
likely that unproﬁtable and white elephant projects will be detected and
stopped. At the same time, ﬁrms in emerging markets have a very low level
of external ﬁnance, especially in the N sector. Thus, a lending boom is a
mechanism by which faster growth can be attained. In fact, the lending
boom is a transitional phase ignited by deep economic reforms that make
the future much brighter than the present.
Stopping a lending boom, as for example by increasing reserve require-
ments, would interrupt the policy of promoting the growth of the private
sector. However, allowing the lending boom to continue unchecked in-
creases the debt burden of the economy, which makes it more vulnerable to
crises. Hence, it is not clear ex ante at which point a lending boom should
be stopped.
It is interesting to note that although crises typically are preceded by
lending booms (Tornell 1999), the converse is not true. Gourinchas, Lan-
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probability that a lending boom will end in a crisis is quite small. That is, in
the majority of cases, lending booms end with soft landings. Furthermore,
theoretically lending booms can only develop if the probability of crisis is
small, and they are expected to end with a soft landing if they last long
enough (see Schneider and Tornell 1999, 2000).
Clearly, India has not experienced lending booms of the magnitude as the
ones experienced by Korea. Moreover, India has not suﬀered currency
crises as deep as those endured by Korea. Certainly, this does not mean that
over the last half century the Indian economy has performed better than
Korea’s. Of course, in hindsight, Korean performance could have been im-
proved on the margin. However, we should beware of ﬁne-tuning policies
designed to look great ex post.
Prior to several crises it has been observed that some assets, such as real
estate, experience a steep price inﬂation, which is followed by a price col-
lapse at the time of crisis. Because real estate is used as collateral, there is a
close link between lending and asset price inﬂation during a boom. Thus,
implementing policies that would stop asset price inﬂation will also reduce
the growth of credit. Clearly, it might be dangerous to leave asset price in-
ﬂation unchecked. However, some degree of inﬂation might be desirable as
a tool to ease borrowing constraints.10
What Are the Eﬀects of Reforms That Improve the 
Contracting Technology in Financial Markets?
During the last decade several countries privatized their banks, liberal-
ized their ﬁnancial markets, and implemented legal reforms that facilitated
contracts between private agents. Unfortunately, in several cases these re-
forms have led to an increase in fraud instead of economic growth (see Tor-
nell 2000). The lack of a concurrent improvement in prudential regulation
is often cited as being responsible for this lackluster outcome. Given that
the regulatory framework cannot be improved by decree, the question arises
as to whether such reforms should be implemented regardless of the regu-
latory framework.
To address this issue it is important to note than there is a nonlinearity in
the relationship between the degree of contract enforceability and the de-
sirability of ﬁnancial-sector reforms. This paper will argue that such re-
forms are socially beneﬁcial only if contract enforceability is very low or if
the reforms are radical enough to eliminate balance sheet eﬀects.
An improvement in the ﬁnancial markets’ contracting technology has the
eﬀect of increasing credit at each level of internal funds. In terms of equa-
tions (1) and (5), it means a reduction in the parameter h and an increase in
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10. Schneider and Tornell (1999) study the interplay between asset prices and lending along
a boom.the investment multipliers ms and mr. In the extreme case, if contracts are
not enforceable and the legal system is nonfunctional, it will be almost im-
possible for creditors and lenders to establish a bilateral debt agreement.
With certainty, borrowers would divert funds and default. As a result, credit
to the N sector will be almost nil, and the economy will not be fragile to
crises. In this environment the introduction of systemic bailout guarantees
would obviously not induce greater investment, as suggested in the previ-
ous section. Thus, in these extreme circumstances, privatization of the
banking system and reforms that improve the contractual environment are
clearly socially beneﬁcial.
Consider now the other extreme, in which it is possible to implement le-
gal reforms that reduce the enforceability problem to such a level that even
small ﬁrms in the N sector may enter into bilateral agreements with foreign
lenders. Clearly, in this extreme case, borrowing constraints will not be an
issue. As a result, ﬁrms could borrow up to the level determined by prof-
itability and technological conditions. Therefore, it is socially beneﬁcial to
bring the enforceability of contracts to a level where the majority of do-
mestic ﬁrms and banks do not face borrowing constraints. Moreover, if this
were the case, there would be no role for systemic bailout guarantees. Even
if they were put in place, they would be irrelevant!
However, what if contract enforceability (h) is at an intermediate level?
Would privatization and ﬁnancial reforms that improve private contracting
unambiguously be socially beneﬁcial? The answer is no. A concurrent im-
provement in prudential regulation is essential. Recall that it is not socially
optimal to increase credit to the N sector indeﬁnitely at the expense of the
T sector. There is an interior optimum. Taking as given the generosity of
bailouts (F), an improvement in contract enforceability (1/h) eases borrow-
ing constraints and increases the credit multiplier. However, it does not
eliminate borrowing constraints and balance sheet eﬀects altogether. As a
result, such an improvement in private contracting might induce more
fragility than is socially desirable. Clearly, if one could ﬁne-tune the gen-
erosity of bailout guarantees, one could envision some tradeoﬀ. Unfortu-
nately, systemic bailout guarantees are more often than not determined by
political forces. Either they exist or they do not.
Another way of stating this argument is that, after some point, a further
improvement in contract enforcement will only serve to permit borrowers
and lenders to better collude in ripping oﬀ the bailout agency and tax pay-
ers. Instead of enhancing the rate of growth of the economy, it will simply
facilitate the adoption of white elephant investment projects that mask
theft, or it might make it easier to design fraudulent lending schemes. If not
accompanied by improvements in the regulatory framework, reforms that
simply improve contractual arrangements marginally might have the un-
intended eﬀect of fostering crony capitalism.
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The previous discussion highlights the need to improve prudential regu-
lation concurrently with privatization and ﬁnancial reforms. There are two
levels at which the regulatory body should act. First, it should ensure that
the banking system does not undertake more risk than is socially desirable.
As discussed in the previous section, a risky debt proﬁle might be necessary
in order for the subsidy implicit in systemic bailout guarantees to have the
desired eﬀect of increasing credit and investment. However, this does not
mean that anything goes. Appropriate regulation must determine the ﬁ-
nancial ratios in accordance with the situation of a given country. Blindly
applying the Basel accord requirements does not make sense, because the
level of riskiness induced might be greater than is appropriate for the coun-
try in question.
The second level at which the regulatory body should act is in minimiz-
ing the extent of fraudulent schemes and the adoption of white elephants.
The more eﬃcient the regulatory agency is in blocking these manifestations
of crony capitalism, the more likely it is that systemic bailout guarantees
will induce fast and sustainable economic growth, and the greater the social
payoﬀ associated with reforms that improve contractual enforceability.
In the absence of a strong and independent regulatory agency, it becomes
important to consider whether the ownership of banks should be strictly
separated from ownership of industrial corporations. We will discuss this
below.
Reforms that permit better bilateral private contracting should go hand
in hand with improvements in regulatory capacity. However, it seems that
here lies one of the greatest bottlenecks faced by emerging markets. More
often than not, regulatory agencies fall prey to those they regulate. We now
know that this is a political distortion that cannot be eliminated by decree.
In the case of banks, at the time of privatization a signiﬁcant part of de
facto nonperforming loans are passed on to the new owners. These invisible
nonperforming loans typically reﬂect past hidden ﬁscal deﬁcits or political
payoﬀs. At the time of privatization, it is politically expedient not to recog-
nize them and to pass them on to the new owners. This has two implications.
First, the true capitalization of the newly privatized banks is lower than
what the standard ratios indicate. Second, if the privatizers are also the reg-
ulators, there is a strong reason for regulators to oversee some future mal-
practices of the banks: bankers help regulators hide some nonperforming
loans to begin with. Both implications make it more likely that the recently
privatized banking system will engage in excessively risky lending and even
in fraudulent activities.
Even if the capture of regulatory agencies is not a issue, one must still
worry about regulatory forbearance and evergreening. Regulators have in-
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ing more transitory than they actually are. Doing so avoids forcing banks
either to recapitalize or else seek ﬁscal resources to cover the gap. Because
such actions are politically costly, it is always better to ignore the problem
at least for the time being. Thus, with the acquiescence of regulators, banks
capitalize the past-due interest of de facto nonperforming loans. These
loans now become evergreen accounts. Obviously, this is an explosive situ-
ation: the capitalization of banks will have to be confronted at some point
in the future. In more perverse situations, evergreen accounts reﬂect politi-
cal favors to speciﬁc powerful groups.
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDI-
CIA) implemented in the United States in 1991 has several elements that
might be eﬀective ways to improve the regulatory framework in emerging
markets. This law makes sanctions to banks mandatory and thus lessens po-
litical pressure on regulators. It also includes a prompt corrective action
clause, according to which a bank’s problems must be solved before eﬀective
capital becomes negative. Sanctions are applied in stages that depend on the
level of eﬀective capital. These sanctions include restrictions on dividends
payouts, limits on assets’ growth, and the revocation of management rights.
Furthermore, new capital must be injected by owners before eﬀective capi-
tal becomes negative. With this law, the resolution of a bank does not imply
ﬁscal costs. International organizations could focus attention on this area.
The Role of Foreign Banks
During the last decade, the share of the domestic banking system owned
by foreigners has increased spectacularly. The accepted wisdom is that for-
eign ownership of banks brings three main beneﬁts to an emerging market.
First, foreign banks improve the banking practice and increase know-how.
Second, since the size of the private sector in emerging markets is too small
to permit such a separation, the existence of foreign banks makes it easier
to separate ownership of banks from ownership of industrial corporations.
As we discussed earlier, in the presence of a weak regulatory framework this
separation might reduce the likelihood of fraudulent schemes between
lenders and borrowers.
Third, in case of a systemic crisis, parents of foreign subsidiaries will in-
ject the resources necessary to withstand a run. Note, however, that in gen-
eral foreign subsidiaries are legally separate entities from the parents. Thus,
subsidiaries can declare themselves bankrupt during a crisis without aﬀect-
ing the parent company. Reputation considerations are frequently invoked
to defend the notion that resources would be transferred by the parent in
case of a crisis. This argument is far from obvious, because in case of a sys-
temic crisis all parent banks can refuse to support their subsidiaries (by in-
voking some sort of force majeure clause) without losing reputational cap-
ital vis-à-vis the other major international banks.
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Systemic bailout guarantees can be implemented in several ways. The
particulars will, of course, depend on the exchange rate regime. A nice fea-
ture of Schneider and Tornell’s framework is that the eﬀects of guarantees
and the forces that generate boom-bust cycles are independent of the ex-
change rate regime or monetary policy rule. This feature permits us to study
how guarantees aﬀect the economy under diﬀerent regimes.
With fully ﬂexible exchange rates, the mechanism is literally the same as
the one considered in section 15.3. If agents are highly leveraged and have
risky dollar debt, the economy is vulnerable to self-fulﬁlling crises in which
there is a severe real depreciation, and several agents in the N sector, suﬀer-
ing from balance sheet eﬀects, are unable to repay their debts. As a result,
creditors are paid a proportion F of the contracted payment. This bailout
payment can be ﬁnanced by an international organization or by an increase
in future taxes to the rest of the economy. The real depreciation can arise by
either a nominal depreciation, a change in nominal prices, or a combination
of both.
Consider the other extreme of a ﬁxed exchange rate regime. In the case of
an attack the central bank can defend the currency by either running down
reserves or increasing the interest rate. If the attack is successful, the reduc-
tion in reserves constitutes a bailout payment to bank creditors that with-
draw their funds and convert them into foreign currency. Thus, any defense
policy has associated with it a bailout rate F. Clearly, the bailout rate need
not be 100 percent, because reserves might not suﬃce to cover all the liabil-
ities of the banking system. We should add that the bailout can be comple-
mented by an explicit transfer, as in Mexico during the Tequila crisis. Again,
the real depreciation can come about through a combination of a nominal
depreciation and a change in nominal prices.
In the real world we observe a mixture of both regimes. However, it
should be clear that the forces at work are essentially the same in both
regimes.
15.4.2 Policy in the Aftermath of Crisis
Bailing Out Borrowers versus Bailing Out Lenders
Once a crisis has erupted and a severe real depreciation has taken place,
the main objective should be to contain the meltdown and to minimize the
number of bankruptcies, because ineﬃcient bankruptcy procedures gener-
ate deadweight losses. Productive assets are ineﬃciently liquidated, and hu-
man capital networks are destroyed. Furthermore, reputational capital in
credit markets, which takes a long time to build, is destroyed (Wyne 2000).
Typically, bailouts are granted to lenders, not to borrowers. However,
bailing out lenders does not save borrowers from being decapitalized and
Policy in an Economy with Balance Sheet Eﬀects 727suﬀering bankruptcy. Therefore, despite the occurrence of generous
bailouts, credit crunches have developed in the aftermath of crises during
the 1990s. This has been reﬂected in three regularities. First, depositors’
bank runs have seldom been observed in the crises of the 1990s. Second, in
the aftermath of crises the growth rate of bank loans has typically remained
below the growth rate of deposits. Because the value of collateral collapses,
banks shift their portfolios toward others assets, such as government secu-
rities. Third, the interest rate spread has typically remained above its pre-
crisis level after GDP growth has returned to its trend.
Ex post, extending some type of bailout to borrowers might avoid bank-
ruptcies and ameliorate the credit crunch. This policy, however, might not
be possible to implement because the ﬁscal cost might be enormous. Fur-
thermore, it has perverse incentives eﬀects. First, many borrowers that have
the ability to pay might simply refuse to do so. Because it is extremely diﬃ-
cult to distinguish liquid and illiquid borrowers during a generalized crisis,
it is basically impossible to implement a borrowers’ bailout policy that dis-
criminates among diﬀerent types of borrowers. Second, market mecha-
nisms might be blocked, as borrowers and lenders might delay the resolu-
tion of certain loans.
Piecemeal versus All-at-Once Bailouts
In the aftermath of a crisis the share of nonperforming loans increases
spectacularly. Both regulators and banks have incentives to underreport the
true share of nonperforming loans. This way, bank owners need to inject
less capital, and the government needs to spend less ﬁscal resources up
front. In contrast, reporting the true nonperforming loans might force a
takeover of several banks by either the government or other banks. As a re-
sult, bank owners will lose their franchises, and government oﬃcials will
face political criticism for their failure to regulate the banking system ap-
propriately.
Thus, bankers and regulators have incentives to believe that negative
news is more transitory than it actually is and to make predictions about the
banks’ portfolios that are more optimistic than is warranted by the facts.
The eﬀect of this misperception is an evergreening of banks’ balance sheets.
That is, there is a tendency for banks to classify as performing those loans
that are actually never going to be repaid and for regulators to turn a blind
eye to this mistake. The problem with evergreening is that it generally leads
to an increase in the share of nonperforming loans over time. This is be-
cause interest is not repaid and because banks have incentives to undertake
very risky projects that might have negative expected net present value.
Banks might even have incentives to extend outright fraudulent loans.
Evergreening has two negative eﬀects on the economy as a whole. First,
the ﬁscal cost of the bailout grows over time, and it might even grow faster
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will be deeper and more persistent, because banks will have more incentives
to engage in risky activities than to lend to ﬁrms with low internal funds
(Krueger and Tornell 2000 analyze the Mexican case).
The alternative policy is to recognize at once all nonperforming loans.
Because it is unlikely that bank shareholders will be able to come up with
the necessary capital, the government will have to take over all the liabilities
of the banking system. This policy implies that government debt must in-
crease by several percentage points of GDP in a single year. This is politi-
cally very costly. However, the evergreening alternative is likely to be more
costly socially, as the experience of Japan and Mexico has shown.
Interest Rate and Exchange Rate Responses to Crises
In the standard Mundell-Fleming model, when there is a capital outﬂow
the needed improvement in the current account can be attained with a real
depreciation and with no output costs. According to this view, a deprecia-
tion induces a shift of resources from the N sector to the T sector and makes
the economy more competitive in world markets. As a result, growth re-
sumes quite rapidly after the depreciation.
The Mundell-Fleming framework and traditional balance-of-payments
crisis models are not appropriate for explaining these new boom-bust
episodes because the banking system plays no essential role in these mod-
els. Once we move into a world in which bank lending is essential and debt
is denominated in foreign currency, the traditional policy recommendation
becomes invalid. As we have seen, allowing the real exchange rate to depre-
ciate in order to close the external gap has perverse eﬀects. Because domes-
tic ﬁrms have dollar-denominated debt but revenues denominated in do-
mestic currency, a real depreciation will make some domestic ﬁrms unable
to repay their debts and bankrupt them. This, in turn, will make the prob-
lem even worse. Capital ﬂight will increase, the real exchange rate will de-
preciate even further, and more ﬁrms will go bust. This vicious circle will
generate a meltdown of the domestic sector of the economy.
In this situation an increase in interest rates might not be such a bad idea,
but does it actually work? It is unclear from both an empirical and a con-
ceptual perspective. In a sample of seventy-ﬁve countries over the period
1960–97, Kraay (2000) ﬁnds no evidence that interest rates systematically
increase during failed speculative attacks, nor that raising interest rates in-
creases the probability that an attack will fail. Basurto and Gosh (2000) ﬁnd
that, for the case of Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand in the aftermath of the
1997 crisis, there is little evidence of a perverse eﬀect of a monetary tight-
ening on the exchange rate.
From a conceptual perspective, an interest rate hike is eﬀective in stem-
ming a crisis only if such an increase does not bankrupt a critical mass of
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meet their debt service, then the investment demand will collapse and the
real exchange rate will have to depreciate in order to clear the market for
nontradables. The end result will be the same as that described above.
In contrast, if an interest rate hike simply induces a reduction in absorp-
tion but does not induce generalized bankruptcies, then an immediate cri-
sis might be avoided. The question then arises as to whether the time of
reckoning will not simply be pushed forward. Will higher domestic interest
rates simply induce foreign investors to exploit arbitrage opportunities dur-
ing a short period until central bank reserves are depleted? Will higher do-
mestic interest rates make several ﬁrms insolvent and lead them to bank-
ruptcy in the near future? It is necessary that the answers to these questions
be in the negative in order for an interest rate increase to avoid a crisis.
Clearly, the speciﬁc situation of a country will determine the correct mix of
exchange rate depreciation and interest rate increase.
15.5 Conclusions
This paper has argued that even if bailout guarantees are an inevitable
consequence of ﬁnancial liberalization and bank privatization, it does not
follow that the liberalization policies of the late 1980s and early 1990s were
doomed to fail. We argue that ﬁnancial liberalization policies can induce
higher long-run growth if they are accompanied by an appropriate regula-
tory framework.
The reforms of the late 1980s liberalized trade and ﬁnancial markets in
many emerging markets. These reforms also signiﬁcantly reduced the role
of the state in the economy. Suddenly, the future looked much brighter than
before, and the private sector much smaller than was desirable. Unfortu-
nately, legal and judicial reform could not be implemented as easily as the
other reforms; as a result, many of the institutions that support the provi-
sion of external ﬁnance have not yet developed in emerging markets. There-
fore, most ﬁrms in these economies have been severely credit constrained.
The introduction of systemic bailout guarantees into such credit-
constrained economies eases borrowing constraints and permits higher in-
vestment and higher growth. However, this comes at the cost of higher vul-
nerability to crises, because systemic bailout guarantees induce agents to
adopt risky debt proﬁles. In fact, systemic bailout guarantees lead to higher
growth only if the economy becomes vulnerable to crises, so that there exist
some states of the world in which the implicit subsidy can be cashed in. It is
important to note that the likelihood of a crisis must be small in order for
investment and growth to increase.
Clearly, not every bailout-guarantee scheme will lead to higher growth. It
is essential that authorities can commit to refrain from granting bailouts on
an idiosyncratic basis. Furthermore, an eﬃcient regulatory framework
730 Aaron Tornellmust be in place to ensure that banks perform their monitoring and screen-
ing role eﬃciently and to avoid corrupt banking practices.
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Comment Charles W. Calomiris
Aaron Tornell’s paper might be retitled “Learning to Love Twin Crises.” In
essence, Tornell derives conditions under which government policies that
promote anticipated bailouts, moral hazard in lending, and credit-driven
boom and bust cycles might be better than a laissez-faire policy of benign neg-
lect. The essential idea of the paper—that imperfect capital markets can pro-
vide a rationale for bailouts—is not entirely new. Economists and politicians
frequently defend bailouts on the static, ex post grounds that in the presence
of imperfect capital markets, bank failures and a collapse of corporate bal-
ance sheets make it very hard for eﬃcient capital allocation to occur. The
logic of this static approach runs as follows: Firms with positive net present
value projects may be in scarce supply. If those ﬁrms are not creditworthy (be-
cause of their high postcrisis debt burdens or because the insolvent or weak-
ened banks on which those ﬁrms must rely for credit cannot themselves raise
funds), then eﬃcient ﬁnancing of positive net present value projects may not
occur. Bailouts that relax credit constraints on borrowers or their banks thus
have a positive side: they keep funds ﬂowing to eﬃcient users that otherwise
would not receive funding (in the absence of government interventions).1
Tornell’s analysis, which is founded on Schneider and Tornell (2000),
however, is more interesting than the standard ex post, static argument for
bailouts, for several reasons. First, he makes explicit the role of hard cur-
rency borrowing and nontradable goods in connecting intrinsic macroeco-
nomic risk and ﬁnancial fragility in developing countries. Second, Tornell’s
focus is on ex ante bailout policy. He argues that a policy of anticipated
bailouts may be desirable because it promotes greater lending beforethe cri-
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1. This line of static reasoning can be supported by models of imperfect capital markets (e.g.,
Leland and Pyle 1977; Stiglitz and Weiss 1981; Calomiris and Hubbard 1990) and by empiri-
cal evidence, much of which pertains to the U.S. experience during the Depression (Fisher
1933; Bernanke 1983; Calomiris and Mason 2001).sis. Third, while many advocates of bailouts neglect or underestimate the
role that bailouts play in causing crises, Tornell, in contrast, assumes that
bailouts will be anticipated and that bailout policies themselves will cause
twin crises to occur. The novelty of Tornell’s paper is that it shows that,
notwithstanding the fact that bailouts cause and are known to cause costly
twin crises, anticipated bailouts may still be worthwhile as a “second-best”
means of addressing capital market imperfections.
Let me begin by commenting on the proposition that bailout policies
cause twin crises to occur in developing economies. The primary mecha-
nism linking banking collapse and currency collapse (the two elements of
twin crises) operates through the eﬀect of bailouts on government debt bur-
dens and the resulting pressure to increase the supply of money. Govern-
ment payments to failed ﬁnancial institutions can so weaken government
ﬁnances that the only viable currency policy in the wake of a bank bailout
is depreciation. A secondary linkage (which I will return to below) is also
important: currency markets are a convenient means for desperate banks to
take on risk as a resurrection strategy. As the economy weakens, insolvent
or weak banks increase their exposure to exchange rate risk intentionally on
the oﬀchance that depreciation can be avoided (an outcome that would de-
liver substantial proﬁt to them). Protected banks’ and ﬁrms’ decisions to in-
crease their exchange rate risk exposure in the presence of bailouts also in-
crease the potential ﬁscal costs of twin crises.
Historical evidence clearly supports the view that foreseeable bailouts,
and the ﬁscal links that connect bank risk and exchange risk, cause severe
twin crises. In the past two decades, government protection of failed banks
has been nearly ubiquitous. At the same time, there have been scores of twin
crises throughout the world. That experience has been unprecedented. For
example, in the three decades prior to World War I, anticipated bailout
policies were very rare, as were twin crises, and the countries that experi-
enced a simultaneous collapse of banks and exchange rates during the pre-
World War I era were precisely those that had established bailout policies.2
Argentina in 1890 is the clearest historical case in which a twin crisis was
caused by an anticipated bailout in the wake of an adverse terms-of-trade
shock. State-guaranteed, bank-issued mortgages (cedulas) were traded in
the London capital market in the years before the crisis and enjoyed essen-
tially the same yield as Argentine government debt. Banks proﬁted by bor-
rowing at the government rate and lending at higher interest rates (thus
pocketing the diﬀerence). The spread earned by the lender increased with
the riskiness of the mortgage and thus encouraged lenders to originate risky
mortgages. The exchange rate collapse during the Argentine crisis of 1890
reﬂected the magnitude of increased government debt as the holders of gov-
ernment guarantees sought relief from the government.
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2. See Calomiris (2001) for a review of the pre–World War I experience.In Italy in 1893, the simultaneous failure of banks and depreciation of the
currency similarly reﬂected the ﬁscal costs the government bore from pro-
tecting the banking sector. The extent of promised protection in Italy was
less than in Argentina, and the extent of banking and exchange rate collapse
was also less. In other countries (e.g., Australia in 1893 and Russia and Nor-
way in 1900–91), substantial banking collapse occurred with few or no gov-
ernment bailouts of banks, and exchange rates remained ﬁxed.
An interesting feature of the Tornell paper is the distinction it draws, in
theory, between conditional bailout policies (state-contingent policies that
address credit-market imperfections) and unconditional bailouts. Tornell
shows that the economic beneﬁt of bailouts is to reduce the contractionary
eﬀect of system-wide risk on the supply of credit in developing economies.
There is little ex ante gain from providing bailouts for individual ﬁrms dur-
ing normal times, and therefore ﬁrms and banks that fail during normal
times should not be protected.
How could Tornell’s state-contingent rule be implemented? In theory,
one could come close with a two-part policy that (a) insures bank deposits
(and perhaps even some of bank stock value, by putting in place a policy of
state-contingent government recapitalization of failed banks, as described
in Calomiris 1999) and (b) requires protected banks to hold suﬃcient capi-
tal, so that government insurance of deposits and capital would only be
drawn upon if aggregate bank losses are large.
It is tempting to conclude from this theoretical discussion that conﬁning
protection to a narrowly deﬁned set of macroeconomic states by establish-
ing an appropriate mix of bank or borrower protection and capital stan-
dards would enable one to expand the supply of credit but limit the moral-
hazard costs of protection, and thus provide a useful subsidy for lending to
productive activities at little social cost. In fact, however, I am extremely
skeptical of the practicality of that conclusion for several reasons.
First, it is very diﬃcult to construct a capital standard for banks that en-
sures that banks do not abuse the government safety net by holding insuﬃ-
cient amounts of capital (relative to the amount the regulator would want
them to hold, and reﬂecting the risk position of the bank). Capital is diﬃ-
cult to measure because the value of nonmarketable assets held by banks is
hard for regulators to gauge in real time, and risk is also diﬃcult to measure.
Furthermore, the incentives of regulators to measure capital and risk and
to punish violations of capital standards can be weak or perverse, which
also serves to undermine the eﬀectiveness of these rules. That is not to say
that the problem is hopeless, but in the vast majority of countries (largely
for political reasons) there is little immediate prospect of establishing a
credit capital standard (for a review, see Calomiris 1999; Shadow Financial
Regulatory Committee 2000).
Second, Tornell’s model imagines that the extent of the systematic risk is
exogenous and that increased risk corresponds to increased productive
734 Aaron Tornelllending. In reality, however, decisions about the extent, timing, and type of
systematic risk are endogenous to protected banks’ and ﬁrms’ choices (e.g.,
choices about foreign exchange risk exposure) in ways that can make the
beneﬁts of protection lower and the costs higher than those imagined in the
model.
With regard to the type of systematic risk ﬁrms choose, it is possible that
much of the protection oﬀered by the government will be used to subsidize
useless or negative present-value activities. Some ﬁrms, for example, will
take on exchange rate risk, not because they must borrow in foreign cur-
rency, but because it is the easiest way to increase risk quickly when one is
engaging in a “resurrection” strategy. Furthermore, the creation of protec-
tion for banks entails the creation of rents, and those rents typically will be
distributed through political competition. Thus, protection will be cap-
tured by cronies and used to support the risks of the powerful, who in gen-
eral are not necessarily the most productive.
With regard to the extent of systematic risk, state-contingent protection
will itself substantially increase the endogenous choice of “factor loadings”
on systematic risks by individual ﬁrms, and those loadings can suddenly in-
crease in the wake of adverse shocks that ﬁrms face. As noted above, weak
or insolvent ﬁrms often undertake to increase their risk in response to a re-
cessionary shock. The reason is that the “put option” value of protection
increases as the ﬁrm’s capital shrinks (in the wake of an adverse shock),
which encourages ﬁrms to adopt resurrection strategies. If risk is a choice
variable that can be increased very quickly (via exchange rate swaps, for ex-
ample), then the frequency and social costs of state-contingent protection
can be much larger than the model contemplates, even though in the years
prior to the crisis the expected subsidies were relatively small (as were the
social beneﬁts from increased lending as the result of the expected subsi-
dies). In other words, in order to be more realistic, the Tornell model needs
to add a middle period to its dynamics—a period in which ﬁrms may
choose to add risk after adverse shocks have occurred and in pursuit of ob-
jectives that are not necessarily socially desirable.
In practice, therefore, it is unlikely that protection will result in a net so-
cial beneﬁt because of endogenous choices by ﬁrms and banks to undertake
very risky and very wasteful projects and to substantially increase unpro-
ductive risks in the midst of a recession. These choices have been visible in
the major crises observed recently. Mexican banks’ speculative swap trans-
actions in 1994–95 are one example; wasteful transfers to Korean chaebol
or to unproductive Russian banks or crony capitalists in Indonesia are
other examples. The devastating twin crises in these and scores of other
countries over the past twenty years (Chile in 1982–83 was arguably the ﬁrst
major case) typically were preceded by years (sometimes decades) of waste-
ful capital allocation by protected banks.
Studies of the eﬀects of ﬁnancial protection on economic growth, macro-
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creases in ex ante protection are associated with lower economic growth,
less ﬁnancial depth, and greater ﬁnancial and economic instability (for a re-
view, see Beim and Calomiris 2001, chap. 7). These adverse eﬀects of pro-
tection on growth and ﬁnancial depth are clearly at odds with the predic-
tions of the Tornell model.
What kinds of alternatives to bailout policies should be considered in
light of the practical problems with implementing such protection? One
possibility (call it the “mercantilist” approach) is to grant monopoly rights
to certain merchants to overcome capital scarcity. This can be a way to cre-
ate “capital” in the form of charter value, which can help mitigate ﬁnancial
constraints. This was a popular and successful means for promoting con-
quest and development used by European sovereigns in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries. Like bailout policies, this approach entails large social
costs (ineﬃcient monopolistic pricing and the concentration of political
power) that may outweigh any gains from capital market improvements.
A second option would be to go in the opposite direction—to encour-
age, and perhaps even subsidize, foreign entry by banks and other ﬁrms
into the domestic economy on a competitive basis. Global ﬁrms are better
diversiﬁed and have greater access to capital markets. Tornell is right to ob-
ject that subsidiaries of international banks may still be subject to local
risks (because they are chartered as independent entities), but their costs
of capital are much lower than those of domestic banks because they can
raise capital in international equity markets. This advantage is substantial
and important, even if foreign subsidiaries remain legally independent.
Furthermore, I do not believe that large global banks would abandon their
subsidiaries lightly, even if they became insolvent. Finally, given that for-
eign subsidiaries are unlikely to be protected by local governments, they
maintain suﬃcient capital and risk controls so that they are much less
likely to fail. For these reasons, I think the potential gains from the relax-
ation of capital-market constraints resulting from free foreign entry are
very large.
A third alternative approach would be to develop a means to hedge na-
tional risk (e.g., via the gross domestic product derivatives contracts imag-
ined by Shiller 1993), and to rely on these new hedges to insulate domestic
ﬁrms and domestic banks in developing countries from country-speciﬁc
macroeconomic risks that produce severe exogenous shocks. In essence,
these prospective innovations would provide the means for countries to
undo the consequences of borrowing in hard currency. In fact, if such
hedges were costlessly available, it would be possible for all lending to occur
in local currency and for lenders to use derivatives to insulate themselves
from local macroeconomic shocks.
Of the possible alternative approaches, I think the second option (en-
couraging foreign entry) has the most immediate promise. It is, of course,
736 Aaron Tornellnot politically viable in many countries, where protection of rent-seeking
cronies or nationalistic sentiment would not permit such an approach.
To the extent to which we are stuck with bailouts as a policy option be-
cause of political constraints on international diversiﬁcation, our eﬀorts
should focus on ways to limit the adverse incentives that magnify the social
costs of bailouts. In particular, I have argued elsewhere that creating eﬀec-
tive, clear, and credible rules to guide bailout policies would make bailouts
less frequent and less costly and protection of banks more incentive-
compatible. These rules would include credible loss-sharing arrangements
for recapitalizing banks and reforms to bank capital standards that en-
courage greater use of market signals in the regulatory process (Calomiris
1999; Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee 2000).
To the extent that these improvements are feasible, it may someday be
possible to reap some of the social gains from anticipated bailouts that the
Tornell model envisions. However, we should consider alternative policies
(especially free foreign entry) that solve capital-market imperfections in a
simpler and more robust way. Moreover, before we can even contemplate
the potential beneﬁts of limited, state-contingent bailouts, we must put in
place the institutional infrastructure, which is currently lacking, that would
make such beneﬁts possible. It would be unfortunate if a reader of the Tor-
nell paper saw it as a justiﬁcation for existing bailout policies (which oper-
ate without necessary and elusive complementary institutional reforms),
which it is not; it is important to emphasize that in the real world bailout
policies do much more harm than good.
References
Beim, David O., and Charles W. Calomiris. 2001. Emerging ﬁnancial markets. New
York: McGraw-Hill.
Bernanke, Ben S. 1983. Non-monetary eﬀects of the ﬁnancial crisis in the propaga-
tion of the Great Depression. American Economic Review 73 (June): 29–51.
Calomiris, Charles W. 1999. Building an incentive-compatible safety net. Journal of
Banking and Finance 23 (October): 1499–520.
———. 2001. Victorian perspectives on the banking crises of the 1980s and 1990s.Co-
lumbia Business School. Unpublished manuscript.
Calomiris, Charles W., and R. Glenn Hubbard. 1990. Firm heterogeneity, internal
ﬁnance, and credit rationing. Economic Journal 100 (March): 90–104.
Calomiris, Charles W., and Joseph R. Mason. 2001. Consequences of bank distress
during the Great Depression. Columbia Business School, Working Paper.
Fisher, Irving. 1933. The debt-deﬂation theory of the Great Depression. Economet-
rica 1 (October): 337–57.
Leland, Hayne, and David Pyle. 1977. Informational asymmetries, ﬁnancial struc-
ture, and ﬁnancial intermediation. Journal of Finance 32 (May): 371–87.
Schneider, Martin, and Aaron Tornell. 2000. Balance sheet eﬀects, bailout guaran-
tees and ﬁnancial crises. University of California, Los Angeles, Working Paper.
Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee. 2000. Reforming bank capital regulation.
Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute.
Policy in an Economy with Balance Sheet Eﬀects 737Shiller, Robert. 1993. Macro markets: Creating institutions for managing society’s
largest economic risks. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Stiglitz, Joseph E., and Andrew Weiss. 1981. Credit rationing in markets with im-
perfect information. American Economic Review 71 (June): 393–410.
Discussion Summary
Anne O. Kruegersaid that the intuitive argument of the paper was that there
was some distortion in the economy that would lead to a lower investment
level and result in a lower growth rate unless we do something to correct it,
such as instituting government bailout guarantees. However, she said, the
right question is how to correct the distortion and achieve the “ﬁrst-best”
situation rather than focusing on choices of second-best policies. She
pointed out that this is diﬀerent from the strategy that ﬁrst accepts the exis-
tence of the bailout guarantee policy, then tries to mitigate its consequences
and make it a better bailout. Krueger conjectured that the ﬁrst-best policies
are the ones that reduce the bailout and achieve the growth rate, as by giv-
ing an across-the-board subsidy to investment through tax policy or giving
investment tax credits directly. She suggested that the lessons of the Asian
crisis are that governments must ﬁnd a structure or a set of incentives to pre-
vent nonhedged foreign exchange exposure, which tends to intensify crises.
Indeed, she said, it is possible to ﬁnd a way that borrowing could only be
conducted in domestic currency throughout the world, which would re-
move the interaction between the domestic and international crises.
Paolo Pesenti praised the paper for providing a welfare analysis for the
presence of government bailout policy. In the paper, bailout guarantee
stems from a need to partially oﬀset the borrowing constraints, and the gov-
ernment ends up with a “Goldilocks” bailout policy: not too much, nor too
little, but just right! It may sometimes lead to crises, but ex ante it maximizes
over the trade-oﬀ between higher growth and potential crisis outcomes.
However, he said, if it was really possible to commit to such an instrument,
why couldn’t the government think of other ways to lift the borrowing con-
straints by designing policies that are less “dangerous” and more eﬃcient in
addressing the original distortion problem, such as, for instance, free entry
of foreign banks, as suggested by Charles W. Calomiris? Jaume Venturaalso
expressed the similar view that the bailout guarantee policy is second best,
not the ﬁrst-best policy.
Ventura pointed out that the bailout policy was perceived as a solution to
the underinvestment problem in the paper, but that the paper did not ade-
quately address the reasons for the underinvestment, that is, whether it was
relative to the perfect information case or due to some kind of external
problems. He said that if the underinvestment problem is a result of the lack
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thing about it. He suggested that the author devote more discussion to the
source of underinvestment, especially the externality of it.
Ventura also commented on a common assumption that the nontrad-
ables sector cannot borrow from and sell to foreigners in the paper. He gave
an example—Spanish utility companies’ buying from Latin America—to
show that this assumption seems to be empirically faulty. He inquired about
the exact role this assumption plays in the model and the alternative as-
sumptions, asking, if it is a shortcut for other assumptions, what they are.
Enrique G. Mendoza followed up on this issue. It is important to look at the
real exchange rate facts to think of them as a disciplining device and to de-
termine how to model them. The experiences of the emerging market are
striking and diﬀer from those of the developed countries. First, the ﬂuctua-
tion in real exchange rate is not the same as the ﬂuctuation in the tradables-
sector price vis-à-vis the nontradables-sector price. Second, one would have
thought, from the standard theory, the nontradables-sector prices meant
the prices of haircuts and services, but this, he said, turns out not to be the
case. In Mexico, there is a large bias toward one particular sector, that is,
the cost of housing. One of the capital-market reports from the IMF that
examines the Asian countries also discussed this phenomenon. Thus, the
change of real exchange rate in these countries has a lot to do with the
change of housing as an asset market.
Michael P. Dooley commented on whether the government can credibly
commit to whom to bail out ex ante. He said that the government chooses
whom to bailout and whom not to, and that the investors who are bailed out
in cases of crisis are the ones that pose the biggest threat to the government.
Investors, knowing that, will only lend to people who would be bailed out
in crises. This implies that the government cannot credibly commit to whom
to bail out ex ante: the market will make its own judgment.
Sebastian Edwards agreed with this view and gave the Chilean case as an
example. According to him, after the massive bailout following the Chilean
banking crisis in 1977, the authorities (Pinochet) made a public announce-
ment that there would be “no more bailouts.” However, when the debt cri-
sis of 1982 erupted in Chile, the government could keep its promise only
with respect to domestic investors: the American bank creditors threatened
the government with the cutting oﬀ of all trade credits to Chile, and they
eventually were bailed out by the government.
Aaron Tornell said that in the 1970s researchers had worked on the ﬁrst-
best policy questions, such as how better to transfer resources to the right
agents in the economy. However, consider a country such as Mexico that
had the objective to grow rapidly but could not raise enough ﬁnancing from
abroad. Moreover, the government did not know to which investors to give
transfers, and the investment subsidies were not well implemented. It was
against such a background that the government chose to use banks as a
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guarantees through the ﬁxed exchange rate regime, hoping this might boost
the economy. Tornell said that he was not defending the bailout policies,
agreeing with the opinion of Dooley and others that one cannot ﬁne-tune
these policies. The paper focused only on the welfare implication of policies
that provide implicit bailout guarantees. The paper shows that these poli-
cies can increase investment at the cost of a higher risk of currency crises.
On the implementation of the bailout guarantee policies, Tornell said
that there is a systemic problem, and the challenge is how to design a mech-
anism that will advance the rule-based resolution of crises. He said that the
speciﬁc ways to implement these policies proposed by Charles W. Calomiris
would probably achieve this goal.
On the welfare aspects, Tornell said that it is very important that regula-
tors be able to exclude, at the outset, white elephant and connected projects.
The outright corruption is an obviously concern, and one should make sure
that it does not happen.
Finally, Tornell answered the question regarding the role played by the
nontradables sector. He said that in Mexico, ﬁrms in tradables sectors could
borrow quite easily on foreign markets via commercial papers and equities.
However, small and medium-sized ﬁrms in nontradables sectors are the
main clients of banks, and they have suﬀered a credit crunch greater than
the GDP growth. Thus, there is a large asymmetry between the tradables
and nontradables sectors, and policy makers are wondering how to improve
the productivity in nontradables sectors.
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